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Social and Legal Influences on
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Donald N. Bersoff
Ennis, Friedman, Bersoff & Ewing
Washington, D. C.
University of Maryland School of Law and
The John Hopkins University

It was the Chinese over 3000 years ago, not the Americans in this century, who

first used large-scale psychological testing (Dubois, 1966). But, as with many
other technological developments, it was the United States that enthusiastically
adopted the method (Haney, 1981). By now it is highly probable that every
person in our country has been affected in some way by the administration of
tests. Testing has become the means by which major decisions about people's
lives are made in industry, education, hospitals, mental health clinics, and the
civil service.
Tests themselves, by and large, are facially neutral. They do not inherently
discriminate against those who take them and, undoubtedly, scores derived from
tests have been used to admit, advance, and employ. For most people, however,
test results have served as exclusionary mechanisms- to segregate, institutionalize , track, and deny access to coveted and increasingly scarce employment
opportunities .
At one time, the work of academic and applied psychometricians went virtually unexamined by the law, but as the use of tests increased in the United
States, so did their potential for causing legally cognizable injury to test takers .
As a resu lt , there is probably no current activity performed by psychologists so
closely scrutinized and regulated by the legal system as testing .
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SOCIAL INFLUENCES
Although recent lig itation and legislation directly affect the continued adm inistration of psychological testing, most especiall y in employment and educational settings, it is my contention that what appears to be an antitesting movement in the courts and in Congress is not an anti testing movement at all. It is my
thesis that , in the main , the law 's concern abo ut testing has been evoked by the
following three major social deve lopments.
I. Our society in the las t 30 years has made attempts, albeit unevenly , to
undo the e ffects of history of de jure segregation and discrimination against
racial and ethnic minorities. Many of the more familiar cases, such as Larry P .
v. Riles (1979) affecting individu al intelligence scales, Debra P. v. Turlington
(1981) t concerning minimal competency tests, and Teal v. Connecticut (198 2)
litigating nuances of employment selection assessment, flow inexorably from
Brown v. Education (1954) and are simply renewed claims by minorities for the
fulfillment of the meaning of the 14th Amendment 's equal protection clause.
They refl ect the most recent challenges to practices that are perceived as attempts
to continue , in a more soph isticated manner, the racial and ethnic separation
more blatantly used in the early 1950s and 1960s by educational institutions and
public and private employers .
2. T he courts have recognized , as a constitutional imperative, the right
against impermissible intrusion by the government into the private li ves of its
citizens. Defining the right to privacy has been di ffic ult for the courts, but
recently the Supreme Court noted that one aspect of the right " is the individual
interest in avoiding di sclosure of personal matters [Whalen v. Roe, 1977 , p.
598]" or as the late Justice Brandeis more esthetically phrased it , " the right to be
let alone [Olmstead v. United States, 1927, p. 478]." If, as Reubhausen and
Brim ( 1965) assert , the' 'essence of privacy is . .. the freedom of the individual
to pick and choose for himself the time and circumstances under which , and most
importantly , the extent to which, his attitudes, beliefs, behavior and opini ons are
to be shared with or withheld from others [pp. I 189- 11 90]," one can eas il y see
why the broad spectrum of testing, but particularly personality and attitude
testing , wou ld be the object of legal scrutin y.
3. Finally, there has been a third soc ial development that has influenced the
law's concern with testing. Unlike judicial declaration s concerning di scrimination and privacy, this last influence is not of recent vintage . As a soc ial phenomeno n it has been part of human culture since its beginning. If you will pardon
a highly technical psycho legal term , I would like to call this third as pect stupidity. Stupidity may be defined as negligence or, alternatively, the fa ilure to use
reasonable care in carrying o ut one's obligation s. Although it does not connote
IComplete c itatio ns for all cases referenced in the tex t are found in Table 5. 1.
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intentional or willful desire to harm, negligent harm can be just as damaging as
purposefully inflicted injury. It is my thesis that stupidity , more than modern
interpretations of equal protection and privacy , has been responsible for the
increased legal regulation of psychological testing. On this count, both psychologists and judges must be faulted.
I believe that almost all the important legal decisions concerning psychological testing may be viewed as various combinations of the social phenomena
identified as items 1 to 3 just given. I would like to spend some time in developing this thesis by giving several pertinent examples from educational , employment, and forensic settings .

SOCIAL INFLUENCES ON LEGAL DECISIONS: SOME
EXAMPLES
Education
The Supreme Court's ringing declarations in Brown v. Board of Education
(1954) ended state-imposed segregation in the public schools. But in the decade
after Brown, many southern school systems refused to accept the Court ' s decision as final. They interpreted the Court's assertion that separation of black
children from white "solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority ... that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone [po 494]" as an empirically testable hypothesis , not a normative legal
principle . Thus, in the early 1960s one of Georgia's school systems sought to
disprove what it believed to be an erroneous factual premise . It alleged the segregation they were accused of perpetuating was not based on color "but rather
upon racial traits of educational significance as to which racial identity was only
a convenient index [Stell v. Savannah- Chatham County Board of Education,
1963, p. 668]." They attempted to show that differences in learning rates ,
cognitive ability, behavioral traits, and capacity for education in general were so
great that not only was it impossible for black children and white children to be
educated effectively in the same room but that to "congregate children of such
diverse traits in schools . . . would seriously impair the educational opportunities of both white and Negro and cause them grave psychological harm [po
668]. "
To prove their contentions the defendants called several expert witnesses,
among them two psychologists, Travis Osborne and Henry Garrett. Based on
such instruments as the California Achievement Test and the California Mental
Maturity Tests, they testified that significant differences in test scores were
indicative of inherent differences in the races and that only minor changes could
be achieved by educational readjustment or other environmental change. AI-
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TABLE 5.1
Table of Cases

Albe marle Paper Co. v. Moody , 422 U.S. 405 (1 975).
Ballew v . Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 ( 1978).
Baltie v. Estelle, No . 79- 1567 (5 th Cir. Sept. 11 , 198 1).
Brown v . Board of Education , 347 U.S. 483 (1 954).
Debra P. v. Turlington, 644 F.2d 397 (5 th Cir. 198 1).
Estelle v . Smith , 45 1 U.S. 454 (1 98 1).
Firefighters Institute v. City of St. Loui s, 6 16 F.2d 350 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied sub nom.
United States v. City of St. Louis, 452 U.S. 938 (1 98 1).
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 10 13 (D.C. Cir. 1923) .
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 40 1 U.S. 424 ( 1971 ).
Guardians Assoc iation v. New York Civil Service Commission , 630 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1980) ,
cert. denied, 452 U.S. 939 ( 198 1).
Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp . 40 1 (D . D.C. 1967) afj'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Kirk land ' v. New York State Dep' t. of Correctional Services 520 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied. 429 U.S. 823 (1 976).
Larry P. v. Riles, 495 F. Supp . 926 (N.D. Cal. 1979) appeal docketed . No. 80-4027 (9th Cir. ,
Jan. 17 , 1980).
Merriken v. Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E .D. Pa. 1973).
Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S . 439 ( 1928).
PASE v. Hannon, 506 F. Supp. 83 1 (N .D. III . 1980).
Stell v. Savannah-Chath am Board of Educat ion, 200 F. Supp . 667 (S.D. Ga. 1963) , rev' d 333
F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S . 933 (1 964).
Teal v. Connecticut , U.S ., 102 S. Ct. 2525 (1982).
Wash ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Whalen v. Roe , 429 U.S. 589 ( 1977) .

though these test results and testimonies went unchallenged by attorneys fi ghting
to enforce desegregation, the idea that such devices could measure innate ability
fo und its way into a 1967 decision that, at the time, became the most persuasive
and widely quoted legal opinion of its kind . That case is Hobson v. Hansen.
At issue in Hobson was not psychological testing but rather the constitutionality of disparities in the allocation of financial and educational resources in
the Washington, D .C., public school system that, it was claimed , fa vored white
children. Also at issue was the overrepresentation of black children in lower, and
white children in upper, ability groups. But, in the course of the tri al, it was
adduced that the method by which track assignments were made depended almost entirely on such standardized group ability scales as the Metropolitan
Readiness and Achievement Test and the Otis Quick-Scoring Mental Ability
Test. Hobson, when read in its entirety, represents the justi fied condemnation of
rigid , poorl y conceived classification practices that negatively affected the educational opportunities of minority children and led to permanent stigmatization of
bl acks as unteachable . But swept within Hobson' s condemnation of harmful
classification practices were ability tests used as the sole or primary decision-
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making dev ices to justify placement. Not only was ability grouping as then
practiced in the District of Columbia abolished , but tests were banned unless they
could be shown to measure children's innate capacity to learn . No psychologist
who has written on the subject, including Jensen (1969 , 1980) , believes that tests
solely measure hereditary endowment (Anastasi, 1976; Cleary, Humphreys,
Kendrick, & Wesman, 1975). No test could pass such a criterion .
Left unscathed in Hobson were the stately, revered , and venerated dev ices
against which all other tests were measured- the individual intelligence scales.
But that was soon to change as the result of actions brought in San Francisco and
Chicago. Two di ametrically opposed decisions, Larry P. v. Riles (1979) (the San
Francisco case) and PASE v. Hannon (19 80) (the Chicago case) are seen by
psychologists as attacks on IQ tests. That, however, is a significant misperception . Like Hobson, these two pieces of litigation are actually chall enges to
educational practices deemed to be discriminatory . [Similarly , the recent attack
on minimal competency tests, see Debra P . v. Turlington (1981), is more appropriately seen as a claim by black children that the use of such tests is merely a
subtle but effective effort by states to resegregate the public schools .]
The real issue was the basis for di sproportional pl acement of black children in
segregated, self-contained classes for the educably mentally retarded. Throughout his opinion , Judge Peckham in Larry P. v. Riles [hereafter Riles ] labeled the
EMR program "dead-end," " isolating," " inferior," and "stigmatizing." Relying on the testimony of state employees or printed material from the state
department of education, the court concluded California's EMR classes were
"designed to separate out children who are incapable of learning in regular
classes [Riles, 1979 , p. 941]" and were not meant to provide remedial instruction so that children could learn the sk ills necessary for eventual return to regular
instruction. Given these characteristics , the court considered "the decision to
place children in these classes . .. a crucial one. Children wrongly placed in
these classes are unlikely to escape as they inevitably lag farther and farther
behind the children in regular cl asses [po 942]." And, as in H obson , the primary
bas is for these decisions were found to be tests- most often the WISC-R and the
Stanford-Binet.
Interpreting the nondi scriminatory provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973 and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975 (Pub. L.
94- 142), particularly regulations requiring that assessment instruments be "vali dated for the specific purpose for which they are used [35 C.F.R. §104.35; 34
C.F.R. §300 .532]," Judge Peckham found the challenged tests unable to meet
that requirement. The tests, the court ruled, would have to be shown valid for
selecting childre n who belonged in substandard , segregated educational anachroni sms (otherwise known as EMR classes). And because that kind of validation
had not been done, the court permanently prohibited Californi a "from utili zing,
permitting the use of, or approving the use of any standardized tests .. . for the
identification of black EMR children or their placement into EM R classes [po
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989]" without first securing the court's approva l. Even Judge Grady, who in
PASE v. Hannon ( 1980) upheld the use of indi vidual intelligence tests in a
simil ar challenge concluded that inappropriate placement in an EMR class was
an educational tragedy that was li kely to be totally harmful.
Emp loy ment
Sim il ar phenomena as I have described in public schools occurred in employment settings. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971), whi ch introduced the
concept of " job-relatedness" into the law of employment testing and created a
morass not yet fully resolved, wou ld never have been decided if the defendants
had not had a history of racial discrimination. Prior to 1965, the Duke Power Co.
openly discriminated on the basis of race in the hiring and assigning of employees at its Dan River plant. Blacks were employed only in the lowest level
jobs and at the lowest rate of pay. In 1964 Congress passed T itle VII of the Civil
Rig hts Act prohibiting discrimination in employment on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin . On July 2, 1965, the date on which T itle VII took
effect, Duke Power decided to no longer restrict blacks to the lowest level
positions. However, at the same time, it instituted a policy that, to qualify for
placement in hi gher leve l positions, employees would have to achieve sati sfactory scores on the Wonderlic Personnel Test, purportedly an intelligence measure,
and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test. Blacks challenged the tests,
claiming that neither instrument was directed or intended to measure the ability
to learn to perform a particular job or category of jobs. A unanimous Supreme
Court faulted the company for using "broad and general testing devices [p o
433]" and reminded the defendants that although the use of tests was permissible
under Title VII, they had to "fairly measure the knowledge or sk ills required by
the particu lar job [po 433]."
Simi larly, accusations of purposeful discrimination in both the private and
public sector has stimu lated litigation in such cases as Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody (1975) and Firefighters In stitute v. City of St. Louis ( 1980). The result
has been increasingly sophi sticated challenges to professionally developed tests
even in situations where purposeful discrimination is not an issue [e.g., Guardian Association of New York City v. Civil Service Commission (1980); Teal v.
Connecticut (1982)]. Like educational tests, "employment tests are being subjected to a degree of governmental scrutiny that very few human contrivances
could bear [Wigdor, 1982, p. 67]. "
Privacy
Although discrimination has evoked judicial scrutiny of ability tests, the concern
for the right to privacy has stimul ated simil ar examination of personality tests. If
stup idity has ever fostered a judicial decision concern ing testing, there is no
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better example than Merriken v. Cressman (1973) . The case had its origins in
1970 when a survey, ordered by the Commi ss ion of Montgomery County , Pennsy lvania and conducted by a company called Scientific Resources , revealed that
many children in the county were heavily involved with drugs. Most of the
children who used drugs, the study claimed, possessed some common characteristics. For example, one finding indicated that 80% of the identified drug
abusers felt estranged from their families . On the bas is of such data, Sc ientific
Resources proposed that the County Drug Commission sponsor a drug prevention program, later labeled CPI, for the Critical Period of Intervention. All three
of the county school districts agreed to participate in the program .
There were two phases to the study: identification and remediation. In the first
phase, tests were given to eighth-grade students and their teachers so that certain
students, deemed potential drug abusers , could become part of the remediation
program. The teachers were asked to identify pupils who most and least fit eight
descriptions of antisocial behav ior (e.g . , "This pupil makes unusual or inappropriate responses during normal school activity"). The student form was to be
somewhat lengthier. First , students would be asked to assess their own behavior ,
that is, to state which of the following statements was most like themselves: (1)
someone who will probably be a success in life; (2) one who gets upset when
faced with a difficult school problem; (3) someone who has lots of se lf-confidence; and (4) a student who has more problems than other students. In the next
part of the scale they would be asked questions about their relationships with
their parents and the behavior of their parents (e.g. , to indicate whether one or
both parents "tell me how much they love me" or "make me feel unloved" or
"seem to regret that I am growing up and spending more time away from
home"). Finally , the students would select from their classmates those who fit
certain descriptive statements similar in kind to the ones given the teachers.
The second phase of the study was intervention. When the CPI staff had
analyzed all the results , they would compi le a li st of chi ldren who would have
sign ificant potential for becoming drug ab users. This li st would then be given to
the school superintendent who would organize a joint effort among guidance
counselors, teachers, school psychologists, and others to provide group
therapeutic experiences to which the identified students would be involuntarily
assigned.
When the program was first developed the school system did not intend to
obtain the affirmative consent of the parents for their children to participate.
They did plan to send a letter home to each parent , as follows:
Dear Parent:
This letter is to inform you that, this fall , we are initiating a Drug Program
called "Critical Period of Intervention" (CPl). The aim of thi s program is to
identify children who may be susceptible to drug ab use and to intervene with
concrete measures to help these children. Diagnostic testing will be part of this
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program and will provide data enabling the prevention program to be specific and
positive.
We ask your support and cooperation in this program and assure you of the
confidentiality of these studies. If you wish to examine or receive further information regard ing the program, please feel free to contact the school. If you do not
wish to participate in this program, please notify your principal of this decision. We
will assume your cooperation unless otherwise notified by you [Merriken v. Cressman, 1973 , p. 9 17).

Also, as originally proposed, the study contained no provision for student
consent.
Sy lvia Merriken, the mother of one of the intended participants in the study,
who happened to be a therapist in a drug and alcoholic rehabilitation center,
complained to the principal of the school where her son was enrolled and to the
school board. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) then announced it
would represent Mrs. Merriken in an attempt to enjoin the school permanently
from carrying out its plans. The ACLU began by fi ling a complaint in federal
district court claiming that the program would violate the constitutional rights of
both Mrs. Merriken and her son. It quickly obtained a temporary injunction
prohibiting the county from implementing its proposal until the litigation was
completed. At that point , two of the three schools in Montgomery County decided to discontinue their participation but the Norristown system, where Mrs.
Merriken's son attended, persisted, although it honored the temporary injunction.
When the suit itself began, the school system offered to change the format of
their letter to include parental consent. In another attempt at compromise, the
school modified the test so that students who did not want to be included could
return an uncompleted protocol. But the proposal contained no provision for
student consent and no data were to be provided whereby students could make an
informed choice about participating.
Of the many constitutional challenges Mrs . Merriken made , the court entertained only one of them seriously- the right of privacy. The court found that the
highly personal nature of the instrument disrupted family associations and interfered with the right of the mother to rear her child. It said, "There is probably no
more private a relationship , excepting marriage, which the Constitution safeguards than that between parent and child. This Court can look upon any invasion of that relationship as a direct violation of one's Constitutional right to
privacy [p . 918] ." And although there was no precedent to the effect in the
Supreme Court, the district court declared that privacy was entitled to as much
constitutional protection as free speech .
Although the court failed to analyze the privacy rights of her son (but see
Bersoff, 1983), the court found that Mrs . Merriken was unable to give genuinely
informed consent to the invasion of her personal life because the parental permis-

5.

SOCIAL AND LEGAL INFLUENCES

95

sion letter was so inadequate. The court deridingly compared the letter to a Bookof- the-Month Club solicitation in which parents' silence would be construed as
acquiescence. The letter was also criticized as a selling device in which parents
were convinced to allow children to participate. It was not , as it properly should
be, an objective document telling parents of the potentially negative feature and
dangerous aspects of the program .
There were other problems with the program. The promotional letter promised confidentiality, but the program contemplated the development of a " massive data bank" and the dissemination of data relating to specific, identifiable
students to school superintendents, principals, guidance counselors, coaches,
social workers, PTA members, and school board members. And even if the
school system had been more circumspect and had constructed means by which
the data were less widely distributed (or not distributed at all) , no promise of
confidentiality could take precedence over a subpeona compelling the disclosure
of the material to law enforcement officers. As the court warned:
(T)here is no ass urance that should an enterprising di strict attorn ey co nvene a
special grand jury to investi gate the drug program in Montgomery County, the
records of the cpr Program would remain in violate from subpoenas and that he
could not determine the identity of children who have been labeled by the CPI
Program as potenti al drug abusers lp. 9 16) .

Parents were not at all in formed of this possibility.
Compounding the other pro blems was the fact that the identification instruments did not possess enough psychometric soundness to overcome the hazards
that may have fl owed from their use. Although there could have been considerable harm done to children correctly identi fied , the court was particularly concerned about those children incorrectly identi fied . In a statement that should rai se
the anxiety level of psychologists, it said , "When a program talks about labeling
someone as a particular type and such a label could remain with him for the
remainder of his life, the margin of error must be almost nil [p o 920] ."
Forensics
Ironicall y, the one use of tests that has remained relatively uncriticized is in
fore nsic assessment. Ability tests used in educational and employment decision
making, despite their myriad problems, have been subjected to decades of empi rical analysis and validation. Yet , they have undergone the most scathing
review by the legal system . On the other hand , based on personality and projective instruments, forensic psychologists since the 1940s have routinely testi fied
in cases involving competency to stand trial, insanity , civil commitment , the
causal connection between negligent conduct and emotional and physical injury,
child custody, and the eligibility of criminal defendants for the death penalty.
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Whereas such determinations are at least as cruc ial to the interests of the test
taker and society, personality and projective instruments have escaped wholesale
scrutiny by the courts and remain largely untouched.
As long as psychologists possess the requisite indices of expertise such as
proper education, training, experience, scholarly publications, and professional
affiliation, they are permitted to offer opinions on the kinds of ultimate issues I
have just cataloged based on the adm inistration of tests like the Rorschach,
MMPI, and TAT. Although such testimony has subjected individual psychol ogists to harsh cross-exami nations (Ziskin, 198 1) , the courts have never seriously questioned whether these tests are sufficiently precise to evoke probative
expert testimony or to support valid opinions that will be more helpful than
testimony of the thoughtful layperson to the jury .
The confused approach to expert testimony by psychologists is, in part, explained by a failure to recognize that it is not a unidimensional concept but,
rather , involves three levels of inference. The first level consists of the psychologist's personal observation of the client made during the course of the clinical
evaluation, including essentially objective data about the individual's behavior
and the uninterpreted results of psychological testing. The second level moves
from reporting observations to the synthesis of data to form a diagnosis that will
classify, and perhaps account for, the behavior manifested during the course of
the evaluation or at the time of the event in question. It is on thi s level that
psychologists make a judgment about whether the person has a mental disorder.
Whether the diagnosis is presented in terms of a particular label or a lengthy
description of personality , the critical element is that the diagnosis derives its
value from the psychometric soundness of the assessment devices used . The third
level concerns an opinion about the ultimate issue (i .e., child custody, or insanity) that the jury or judge must resolve. Whereas I have significant reservations about any testimony by experts as to level three (Comment, 1978; Gass &
Bersoff, submitted for publication) , it is concern about testimony at level two
that is most relevant to this chapter.
The test for the adm issib ility of scientific evidence was developed 60 years
ago in Frye v. United States (1923), which limited such evidence to that which
has gained "general sc ientific acceptance." Under its modern interpretation by
subsequent tribunals, the courts require not only acceptance within the scientific
community but also accuracy. Thus , assessment devices used in the forensic
arena shou ld not only have gained acceptance within psychology but, more
importantly , the accuracy of the technique should be demonstrated to yield
information that is more like ly to be true than could be gleaned from lay testimony. Resu lts from polygraphs and voice spectrography have been denied admissibility because the error rate is considered to be 10 to 25%. If such a criterion
were applied to most clinicians' favorite projective devices , none of the information or diagnostic conclusions derived from them would be admitted in court .
Validity coefficients that clinicians might find highly acceptable may not pass
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legal muster, Tests' vulnerability to situational and experimenter effects and to
such phenomena as illusory correlations (Chapman & Chapman, 1969) have
been well documented (Comment, 1978; Monahan, 1981).
The scientific literature regarding reliability and validity of tests used by
forensic experts suggests that, at best , they are highly suspect and susceptible to
a variety of significant sources of psychometric and interpretive error. They have
limited psychometric soundness even in the hands of the most skilled clinicians ,
and there is little basis to assert that expert opinions , based on projective tests,
are more accurate than layperson's opinions, But, although forensic psychologists may have little empirically based expertise to offer the legal system, they
are uniformly permitted to testify and their judgments often CatTY great weight
with the jury. On the other hand , the work of educational and industrial psychologists undergo close review, even though there is greater reason to believe that
the instruments upon which they rely are more demonstrably accurate. Why? The
answer is partly rooted in tradition- such issues as insanity have confronted the
courts for decades; issues such as proper placement in special education programs or promotion to fire captains have not. But, more importantly, the tests
used in forensic settings do not impinge on privacy or disproportionately affect
racial or ethnic minorities. It is interesting to note, however, that recently foren sic examinations used in criminal settings have raised concerns about the privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel (see Estelle v. Smith, 1981 ,
and Bclltie v. Estelle, 1981),

SOCIAL SCIENCE EVIDENCE AND THE COURTS
All of these conflicting perceptions about psychological tests raise a final issue
with which I wish to conclude- that of the relationship between the social
sciences and the courts, If that relationship were to be examined by a psychoanalyst, the analyst would no doubt conclude that it is a highly neurotic, conflictridden ambivalent affair (I stress "affair" because it is certainly no marriage).
Thirty years ago the vitality of data generated by psychologists seemed assured
when the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) conspicuously
referred to studies by Kenneth and Mamie Clark concerning the effect of segregation on black children. The reference to those studies in a now famous footnote
created a controversy that still exists concerning their relevance and validity
(Cahn, 1955 ; Clark, 1980; Kluger, 1975; Levin, 1978). Despite that controversy
there is little doubt that Brown represents the most dramatic use of social science
scholarship.
But if Brown produced optimism, subsequent events did not uniformly reinforce those buoyant feelings. In the past 5 years the Supreme Court has rejected
empirical data in cases concerning sex discrimination, the death penalty , and
corporal punishment. Perhaps most clearly exemplary of the Court's am-
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bivalence is its decision in Ballew v. Georgia (1978) where it unanimously
agreed that criminal trials before five-member juries unconstitutionally deprived
defendants of the right to trial by jury. Justice Blackmun announced the judgment of the Supreme Court and in his decision relied heavily on the work of
social psychologists and others to support the conclusion that less than six-person
panels substantially and negatively altered the jury process. However, only one
other justice joined that opinion. Three justices were particularly critical of his
use of social science data. In a concurring opinion (indicating agreement with the
outcome but not the reasoning of the primary opinion) Justice Powell, joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, acerbically noted his "reservations
as to the wisdom ... of Mr. Justice Blackmun's heavy reliance on numerology
derived from statistical studies [po 246]."
The same love- hate relationship finds its way into lower-court opinions concerning testing. These opinions, regardless of whether one likes the result, are
generally devoid of sound psychometric reasoning. Even if the conclusions are
correct, the courts often fail to cite the relevant literature in a way that convinces
the reader that the conclusion is empirically supportable.

Social Science in Education and Employment Cases
Education. We can once again return to the education and employment
testing cases for the most pertinent examp les . As you may recall, the court in
Riles permanently prohibited the state from using any standardized intelligence
tests for the identification of black chi ldren for placement into EMR classes and
held that before the state cou ld use IQ tests, it would have to meet the following
standards:
1. Tests would have to yield the same pattern of scores when administered to
different groups of students.
2. Tests would have to yield approximately equal means for all subgroups
included in the standardization sample.
3. Tests would have to be correlated with relevant criterion measures, that is,
lQ scores of black children with classroom performance.
The implication in Riles that an unbiased test must yield the same pattern of
scores when administered to different groups of people is psychometrically unsound . It is generally , though not uniformly, conceded that tests are fair when
they predict with equal accuracy, not with equal results, for all groups. If that
position is correct, then the court's definition "eliminates a priori any possibility
of real group differences on various psychological traits [Schmidt & Hunter,
1974, p. I] . " The court rejected the possibility of genuine inferiority and socialclass differences . Though the court rested its decision on the finding that the tests
were culturally biased, it provided little hard data to support such a conclusion
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and was tentative in discussing it. In fac t, the court 's empirical support fo r its
conclusions consumed only I of 70 printed pages. Moreover, the court's determination that the tests contain questions biased against poor black children is not
uniformly accepted , and there are some data to suggest that whatever discrimi nation there is in tests, lower scores in blacks are not totall y the res ult of content
bi as.
By definition , achievement and intelligence tests will always fail to meet the
demand fo r assessment dev ices devoid of environmental influence. Given what
they purport to measure, they inev itably refl ect the social setting of the test taker:
" [All] behavior is ... affected by the cultural milieu in which the individual is
reared and since psychological tests are but samples of behavior, cultural influences will and should be refl ected in test performance . It is therefore futile to try
to dev ise a test that is free from cultural influences [Anastasi, 1976, p. 345]."
Efforts to produce culture-free tests or to reduce content bias have met with
little success. " Nonverbal or performance tests are now generally recognized as
fa lling short of the goal of freedom fro m cultural influences, and attempts to
develop culture fair verbal tests ... are recognized as failu res [Reschl y, 1979,
p. 23 1] ." More spec ificall y, Anastasi (1 976) states: "On the WISC , for instance, black childre n usuall y fi nd the Performance Tests as difficult or more
di fficult than the Verbal Tests; this pattern is also characteristic of children fro m
low soc ioeconomic levels [p o 348]. " Kirp (1 973) concludes: " [It] is sobering
but instructi ve to recognize that minority children do poorl y even on so-called
culture-free tests [p o 758 ]."
There has been relati vely little research on content bias itself, particularl y
with regard to individual intelligence tests. What has been found with regard to
standardized tests generally (Flaugher, 1978; Green, 1978), or individual intelligence tests specificall y (Reynolds, 1982; Reschly , 1980 ; Sandoval, 1979) , does
not support Judge Peckham ' s conclusions. For example , contrary to popular
thought , such widely criticized questions on the WISC- R comprehension subtest
as, " What is the thing to do if a boy (girl) much smaller than yourself starts a
fight with you?" (a question that even Judge Grady in PASE fo und biased) may
actually be easier fo r black children than they are for white (Reschly, 1979).
Eliminating 13 items perceived to be biased fro m a widely used 82-item elementary reading test " did not improve the perfo rmance of schools with high-minority populations relative to their performance on the original ' biased vers ion '
[Flaugher, 1978, p. 675]." Deleting what appear to be idiosyncratic items fro m
group ability tests res ults only in " making the tests considerably more difficult
for everyone, since many of the items [exhibiting] the widest discrepancy between groups [are] moderate to low in overall diffic ulty [Flaugher , 1978 , p.
675]" (but see Oakland & Matuszek, 1977) . Most pertinentl y, Sandoval ( 1979)
fo und no ev idence of items bias on the WISC-R : "The notion that there may be a
number of items with radically differe nt di fficulties for children fro m diffe rent
ethnic groups has not been supported [p o 925 ]. " Moreover, the interjudge agree-
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ment concerning cultural bias on the WISC-R appears very low (see Reschly
citing Sandoval, 1980).
Although Judge Peckham can be faulted for his analysis of cultural discrimination in intelligence tests and for implying that the issue is more settled than it
is, any criticism of his analysis does not imply that his concl usion is incorrect or
that there is support for such alternative hypotheses as genetics- rejected by all
parties in Riles and PASE--Dr socioeconomic explanations. In any event, the
court in Riles was correct in criticizing test publishers for not adequately standardizing . and validating their instruments on discrete minority populations . The
court could only rest its holding on the data presented to it by the parties. The
state's defense was made difficult by the lack of relevant studies on differential
validity, the absence of systematic research concerning content bias, and California's concession that cultural differences affected IQ scores .
If Judge Peckham's analysis of the issue of cultural bias was scanty and
fau lty , Judge Grady in PASE v. Hannon (1980) can best be described as naive.
At worst it was unintelligent, and completely devoid of empirical content. Distrustful of the expert testimony in the case, he felt it imperative to exami ne the
tests themselves so he could judge whether the claim of cultural bias cou ld be
sustained. Thus, in a startling and extraordinary manner , he proceeded to cite
each question on the Wechsler and Binet scales in an attempt to determine which,
in his estimation, were culturally biased. The result of this analysis was the
judgment that only eight items on the WISC/WISC-R and one item on the
Stanford- Binet were suspect or actually biased . At bottom , what it represented
was a single person's subjective and personal judgment cloaked in the apparent
authority of judicial robes. If submitted as a study to one of psychology's more
respected refereed journals, rather than masquerading as a legal opinion , it would
have been summarily rejected as an experiment whose sample size and lack of
objectivity stamped it as unworthy of publication. The court's opinion in PASE
amply supports Reschly's (1980) conclusion that with regard to item bias on the
individually administered intelligence tests, "subjective judgments appear to be
unreliable and invalid in terms of empirical analysis . . . . The only data confirming test bias that exists now is judgmental and speculative [p o 127]."
What makes Judge Grady's opinion interesting, if not precedent setting, is the
fact the decision contains the questions and correct answers to every item on the
WISC, the WISC-R, and the Stanford- Binet. McClelland ( 1973) suggested
several years ago that tests should be given away. Whether inadvertent ly or
purposely, Judge Grady has done just that. Those who wish to destroy the
usefulness of these tests need only inform parents and anti test advocates of the
existence of the decision and its citation to the proper volume in the series of
legal reports that publishes verbatim all federal district court opinions . Although
Judge Grady eventually upheld the tests as valid, his decision , to a far greater
extent than Judge Peckham's decision in Riles, may have the effect of invalidating the tests as they are presently used. The Psychological Corporation, publisher
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of the Wechsler Scales (and the System of Multi-Pluralistic Assessment
[SOMPA] that uses these scales), tried unsuccessfully to convince Judge Grady
to seal that part of his decision containing the questions and answers to the scales
so that their content would not be published and thus made public. It has since
issued a statement attempting to protect its copyright in the tests and threatens
legal action if it is not protected: "The Psychological Corporation considers
unauthorized reproduction of its copyrighted material fro m any source, including
a court' s opinion , to be an invasion of its rights, including its copyright , and the
right to maintain the necessary security of its tests [Udell , 1980] ." As of this
writing , there has not been specific legal action against those who have informed
general audiences of its existence . But one potential outcome of the decision is
that the security of these tests may have, indeed , been seriously compromised , if
not destroyed.

Employment. The situation with regard to employment testing does not
evoke any greater confidence. There are sharp differences among the federal
courts, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and psychometric
experts as to the proper conceptualization of test validation within the industrial
setting . Novick (1 98 1) has perceptively summari zed the struggle:
Individual federal agencies have res ponsibilities and goals de legated by the exec utive and legislative branches of government , monitored by the judicial branch , and
ultimately spec ified by the incumbent age ncy man agement. Although these agenc ies share concern for benefit s to soc iety as a whole, they tend to foc us attenti on on
their own particul ar mandates, and for thi s reason they often view testing and other
issues quite differently . In fac t, it is not unco mmon for government agencies to be
on opposite sides in litigation involving tests, for employers to receive conflictin g
directives from different government agenc ies, and fo r e mp loyees to find th at the ir
tes t scores are considered in light of widel y varying objectives by employe rs and
government agency represe ntati ves [p. 1035].

The Supreme Court has been particularly unhelpful in sorting out this confusion . For example , in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1 971) a unanimous court
stated that the EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing were "entitled to great
deference" (p . 434). Four years later, Chief Justice Burger, who had written the
dec ision in Griggs now complained in a minority opinion in Albermarle Paper
Co . v. Moody (1 975) about the Court' s "slavish adherence" (p . 452) to those
same G uidelines. Perhaps in a more important example, one I described at some
length in a recent American Psychologist article (Bersoff, 1981) , the Court has
badl y muddled the whole issue of test validation. In Washington v. Davis (1976)
in support of its opinion that validation could be accomplished in "anyone of
several ways," the Court cited the then extant version of the Standards fo r
Educational and Psychological Tests (APA, AERA, NCME, 1974) to the effect
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that there were " three basic methods of validation: 'empirical' or 'criterion '
validity . . . 'construct validity ' ... and ' content' validity [Washington v.
Davis, 1976 , p . 247 , fn . 13] ."
Many indu strial and academic psychologists (Guion , 1980; Messick, 1980 ;
Tenopyr, 1977) contend that insofar as the courts have interpreted the test standards and the EEOC Guidelines (superseded now by the Uni form Guidelines on
Employee Selection Procedures, see EEOC et aI. , 1978) and its implementing
" Question and Answers" (EEOC et aI. , 1979) to mean that content , criterion,
and construct validity are distinct fo rms of validation , those interpretations are
oversimplified , if not erroneous . The Uniform Guidelines , according to thi s
view , inappropriately treat three aspects of validity as "something of a holy
trinity representing three different roads to psychometric salvation [Guion , 1980 ,
p. 386]" rather than viewing them as subsets within the uni fyi ng and common
framework of construct validity. Most judicial opinions, with one or two conspicuous exceptions (see Guardians Association of New York City v. Civil Service Commission, 1980) , concerned with the controversy over content versus
criterion versus construct validity in employment tests also view the th ree as
separable entities rather than on a continum and fail to cite or even recognize the
work of psychologists who have urged a more sophisticated approach to validation analys is. It has been suggested that the term construct-ref erenced validity
(Mess ick, 1975) would more prec isely encompass almost all di screte and speciali zed validation terms, integrating content relevance and content coverage as
well as predictive and diagnostic utility. "The bridge or unifying theme that
permits this integration is the meaningfulness of interpretability of the test
scores, which is the goal of the construct validation process [Messick, 1980 , p.
101 5]. "
In 1982, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the EEOC G uidelines and its implementing Questions and Answers in Teal v. Connecticut ( 1982)
but carefully avoided the issue. In that case, the plaintiffs are fou r bl ack provisional state employees who , when they sought to attain permanent status in their
jobs as Welfare Eligibility Supervisors, were obliged to participate in a selection
process requiring a passing score on a written tes ~. Those who passed the test
became part of an eligibility pool fro m which the state would select successful
applicants. The final determinations were made on the basis of a number of
nontest criteri a (e.g., past work , recommendation) .
All the plaintiffs failed to achieve the cutoff score of 65 on the test which
would have made them eligible fo r further consideration. As a whole, the pass ing
rate for blacks was 68% of that of whites. The unsuccessful plaintiffs then
instituted a suit cl aiming that the state's use of the test violated Title VII .
However, a month prior to tri al, the state made its final selection , the result of
which was that 23% of the eligible blacks and 13.5% of the eligible whites were
promoted to supervisor. The actual promotion rate of blacks, therefore, was
169.5% of the actual promotion rate of whites . Thu s, whereas the end result of
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the state's selection process (the so-called " bottom line" ) was nondiscriminatory to blacks as a class, the threshold testing component did not meet the Uniform
Guidelines "four-fifths" rule, which provides that a "selection rate for any race,
sex, or ethnic group which is less than [80%] of the rate for the group with the
highest rate will generally be regarded ... as evidence of adverse impact [29
C.F.R. §1607.4(c)]."
The federal district court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims, hoiding that they
failed to prove a prima facie case of di sparate impact. It asserted that although
the ratio of the black passing rate to the white passing rate was 68%, the ratio of
the black appointment rate to the white appointment rate was almost 170%.
Thus, under the bottom-line approach found in the EEOC Guidelines, the plaintiffs ' Title VII claim has to fail.
The plaintiffs appealed. The COUl1 of Appeals reversed the lower court ,
holding that "where a plaintiff establishes that a component of a selection
process produced disparate results and constituted a pass- fail barrier beyond
which the complaining candidates were not permitted to proceed, a prima facie
case of disparate impact is established , not withstanding that the entire selection
procedure did not yield disparate results [Teal v. Connecticut, 1981, p. 135]. "
In concluding that the district court was wrong in ruling res ults of the written
examination alone were insufficient to support a prima facie case of disparate
impact, it distinguished an earlier decision by the second circuit court. In Kirkland
v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services (1975), the Court of Appeals
held that proof concerning disparate impact of certain subtests within a larger
examination did not constitute an unlawful discriminatory impact. But, the second
circuit said in Kirkland, all applicants were subj ected to a complete selection
process that, when viewed as a whole, did not produce di sparate results. In Teal,
however, the pass-fail barrier denied employment opportunity to a di sproportionately large number of minorities and prevented them from proceeding to the next
step in the selection process. Thus, the court concluded, affirmative action
policies that may benefit minority groups as a class do not excuse employers'
discriminatory conduct affecting specific and readily identifiable individuals. It
held that "Title VII was designed to protect the rights of individuals" and that it
"matters very little to the victimized individuals that their group as a whole is well
represented in the group ofhirees [pp. 139- 140] ."
The trial court , finding no evidence of prima facie discrimination, never
reached the question of the test' s validity (i.e., its " job-relatedness"), even
though it had been fully tried before the court. However , in addition to reversing
the tri al court' s decision , the Court of Appeals remanded the case with in structions that the lower court evaluate the test itself in light of the EEOC Guidelines.
The state of Connecticut , in June of 198 1, asked the Supreme Court to review
the second circuit' s opinion, arguing that their decision was antagonistic to that
of other circuits who had adopted the bottom-line concept in Title VII cases . The
state also asserted that scrutiny of testing practices in those instances where
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hiring or promotion practices revealed no di sparate impact would redirect employers' concerns from " the overall hiring process to the testing process, and in
that sense [the federal courts would] be restructuring business practices ."
The Supreme Court agreed to review the case and in June 1982 it rendered its
opinion . The Court held , in a 5-4 decision, that " the ' bottom line' does not
preclude ... employees from establi shing a prima facie case [of employment
di scrimination] nor does it provide [an] employer with a defense to such a case
[Teal v. Connecticut, 1982, p. 2529]." The Court reminded employers that
Section 703(a)(2) spoke not in terms of jobs and promotions but of limitations
and classifications that would deprive individuals of employment opportunities .
Thus , " when an employer uses a non-job-related barrier to deny a minority or
woman applicant employment or promotion, and that barrier has a significant
adverse effect on minorities or women, then the applicant has been deprived of
an employment opportunity ' because of . .. race, color, religion , sex, or national origin ' [p o 253 2]. " Therefore, T itle VII protects individuals, not groups
prohibiting victims of a facially discriminatory policy to be told that they have
not been wronged simply because other persons of their race or sex were hired:
"Every individual employee is protected against both discriminatory treatment
and against practices that are fair in for m, but discriminatory in operation .. . "
[po 2535 ] [emphasis added] ."
As a res ult , the Court refu sed to permit employers to claim as a defense in
disparate impact cases that di scriminatory , non-job-related tests that serve as a
pass- fail barrier to employment opportunities are permiss ible becau se the tests
did not actuall y deprive di sproportionate numbers of bl acks of promotions. " it is
clear ," the Court asserted , " that Congress never intended to give an employer
license to discriminate again st some employees on the bi as of race or sex merely
because he favorably treats other members of the employees' groups [p . 2535]. "
The di ssenters, led by Justice Powell , speaking for the Chief Justice and
Justices Rehnqui st and O ' Connor , agreed that the aim of Title VIi was to protect
individuals, not groups. But , they interpreted disparate impact claims to require
proof of di scrimination to groups. The di ssenting opinion argued that prior cases
had made it clear that di scriminatory impact cl aims cannot be based on how an
individual is treated because those cl aims are necessarily based on whether the
group fares less well than other groups under a policy, practice , or test. The
di ssent warned that the majority 's holding could " force employers either to
elimin ate tests or rely on expensive, job-related , testing procedures, the validity
of which mayor may not be sustained if challenged. For state and local governmental employers with limited fund s, the practical effect of today 's decision may
well be the adoption of simple quota hiring [p o 2540] ." Moreover, it cautioned ,
substanti all y fewer minority candidates ultimately could be hired simpl y by
employers integrating consideration of test results into one overall hiring decision because, by so doing, " they will be free to select only the number of
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minority candidates proportional to their representation in the workforce [po 2540
n.8] . "
All these decisions reveal that the issue of test bias is complex and controversial and that opinions concerning its existence are contradictory. Several models
of test bias, particularly with regard to its effect on prediction and selection, have
been offered (Jensen, 1980; Peterson & Novick, 1976) , none of which seem to
have gained favor over others. As Ysseldyke (1978) recently commented:
Several investigators have reviewed the models of test fairness and have concluded
that there is little agreement among the several models. It is readily apparent that
major measurement experts have been essentially unable to agree on a definition of
a fair test, let alone identify a test that is fair for members of different groups. T here
is little agreement on the concept of nondiscriminatory assessment [p o 150].

Definitions of test bias may not only be "widely disparate," stemm ing "from
entirely different universes of discourse [Schmidt & Hunter, 1974, p. I]" but
ethical positions regarding test bias may be "irreconcilable [Hunter & Schmidt,
1976 , p. 1069] . " Finally, and perhaps more importantly , reliance on psychometric models for test bias without consideration of the social and ethical consequences of test use ignores the concerns of significant segments of society .
Although the American Psychological Association Ad Hoc Comm ittee Report on
the Educational Uses of Tests with Disadvantaged Students (Cleary et aI. , 1975)
defended the technical adequacy of tests for prediction and selection, it failed to
consider what minority groups charge was the egregious misuse of tests having a
negative impact on the lives of minorities (Bernal, 1975; Jackson, 1975) . As
Reschly (1979) points out: " to defend tests on the basis of evidence of common
regression systems or to attempt to separate the issues of technical adeq uacy from
the social consequences is insufficient [po 235]." In that light, recent attempts to
examine the ethical, legal, and socia l implications of various models of test bias
are valuable additions to the literature (Cole, 1981 ; Hunter & Schmidt, 1976;
Messick , 1980; Novick & Ellis, 1977; Reynolds, 1982) . In essence, even the
selection of a model to measure and ameliorate test bias is ultimately a value
judgment (Kap lan, 1982).

PSYCHOLOGISTS AND PUBLIC POLICY
My complaints about the Supreme Court should not deflect responsibility from
psychologists. I think it may be legitimate to place at least part of the fau lt for the
current and continuing confusion concern ing tests on psychologists themselves.
One of the more intriguing aspects of Judge Grady's decision in PASE v. Hannon
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(1980) was his almost utter rejection of the testimony of expert psychologists
who testified either for the black children challenging the IQ tests or for the
school system seeking to defend them . In a quote that I think deserves some
thought he said:
None of the witnesses in this case has so impressed me with his or her credibility or
expertise that I would feel secure in basing a decision simply on his or her opinion.
In some instances, I am satisfied that the opinions expressed are more the result of
doctrinaire commitment to a preconceived idea than they are the result of scientific
inquiry . I need something more than the conc lusions of witnesses in order to arrive
at my own concl usion [p. 836).
Several years ago Cronbach (1975) warned psychologists involved in testing
issues not to be advocates. But , far too often they have testified/or one side or
the other. Although psychologists perform a valuable service when they testify as
expert witnesses , they should be aware that their data , interpretations , and opinions will be tested in the crucible of courtroom cross-examination whose very
purpose is to destroy credibility and evoke evidence of bias on the part of the
expert. Whereas the distillation of that process may yield testimony of great
consequence and weight to the court, it can be highly anxiety provoking for the
psychologist who acts as an injudicious advocate pleading for a position rather
than as a cautious, neutral scientist presenting data in an even-handed manner.
Recently, concerned psychologists have indicated the many ways social scientists can influence public policy effectively (Bersoff, 1983; DeLeon, 0 ' Keefe,
Vandenbos , & Kraut, 1982; Horowitz & Katz, 1975; Loftus & Monahan , 1980;
Saks, 1978) . Within the bounds of scientific and professional ethics, that is an
important, if not crucial, role. But, if psychologists are to be respected by the
courts and treated as more than mere numerologists attempting to convince the
judiciary of doctrinaire positions, they must offer more situation-specific, ecologically valid, objective data that serve science, not a particular adversary. In
that way , perhaps , courts may finally arrive at not only judically sound but
psychometrically justified decisions that will withstand both appellate and scientific scrutiny.
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